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INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the aim to minimize the significant suffering and economic impact caused worldwide
by brain diseases and disorders such as dementia, chronic pain, depression, addiction, and autism,
several national, and regional research projects emerged in the recent years to improve our
understanding of brain function and dysfunction. These projects contributed to the development
of neurotechnologies and techniques that have an unprecedented ability (both in terms of scope
and reliability) to “read” mental states, in the sense of decoding information about mental states
or processes by analyzing data about neural activity patterns, and “transcribe” mental states by
modulating neural computation. These technologies and the knowledge obtained through them
are critical to enabling novel therapies for brain disorders and therefore are ethically motivated
by the bioethical principle of beneficence. However, it has been argued that they also entail new
neuroethical challenges that have to be addressed at a regulatory level.
Recently, Yuste et al. (2021) suggested that existing international human rights need to be
further expanded and/or specified because they address certain ethically relevant dimensions of
human life in very generic terms, often subject to interpretation, and regulating the ramifications
of neurotechnology requires greater specificity. Following this idea, countries such as Chile,
Brazil and Spain are stablishing specific rights for the regulation of neurotechnology, also known
as “neurorights.” Some of these proposals are inspired by the framework developed by the
Morningside Group (an interdisciplinary group led by the neuroscientist Rafael Yuste), which
introduces five key neurorights: the right to personal identity, the right to free will, the right to
mental privacy, the right to equal access to cognitive enhancement technologies, and the right to
protection against algorithmic bias.
One of the most discussed neurorights is probablymental privacy. This is the idea that we should
have control over access to our neural data and to the information about our mental processes and
states that can be obtained by analyzing it. The “mind-reading” neurotechnologies that could put
mental privacy at risk consist of a wide variety of applications, including not only the interpretation
of neural activity patterns in isolation (e.g., determining what I am thinking about without using
any external cue), but also the use of neural responses to consciously perceived stimuli (e.g., P300
signals) for identifying experiences of recognition (Rissman et al., 2010), and the use of subliminal
stimuli for detecting sexual preferences (Wernicke et al., 2017) and empathic responses (Chiesa
et al., 2017).
A key issue is whether mental privacy is different from other forms of privacy. Specifically, we
need to determine whether neural data and mental information needs more stringent protection
than other kinds of personal information. I will articulate and support a proposal suggesting
that mental privacy requires a special treatment because of its relation to relevant aspects of
personal identity.
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PRIVACY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL
CAPACITY
A recent proposal posits that mental privacy requires special legal
protection because it is intimately related to who we are. More
specifically, the Morningside Group’s framework, crystalized in
the recent Chilean neuroprotection bill, affirms that neural data
should be treated as organic tissue and thus protected by the laws
for organ transplantation and donation. This approach consists
of two main aspects. Firstly, people not only have a right to
not be compelled to give up brain data but, crucially, brain
data collection requires explicit “opt-in” authorization. Secondly,
brain data cannot be commercially transferred and used but only
donated for altruistic purposes. That is, the commercialization
brain data is prohibited regardless of consent status (Yuste et al.,
2017; Goering et al., 2021).
The appeal of this proposal depends on being able to
explain exactly how mental privacy is related to who we are.
A possible conceptualization of mental privacy as a cognitive
dimension of privacy seems to bring it closer to our identity, thus
perhaps grounding the Morningside group’s view. Given that
all forms of privacy depend ultimately on mentally processing
personal information, this ability can be regarded as the cognitive
source of privacy (Ienca and Andorno, 2017; Goering et al.,
2021; Wajnerman Paz, 2021). Privacy is partly defined by
the control that persons have over the flow of information
about them (i.e., being able to determine “when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to
others,” Westin, 1968). Most often, we say that information
is under our control, at least in part, in a cognitive sense.
For any piece of information, we can consciously grasp it,
reason about its personal and social meaning and its potential
applications, and finally decide whether, when, how, to whom
and to which extent we want to share it. Privacy depends on this
cognitive process of rationally filtering and selectively sharing
information about us. Neurotechnological mind-reading may
be specially threatening for privacy precisely because it by-
passes this fundamental filtering process. Any given piece of
information we have mentally considered and decided not to
share will be anyway available to someone who has direct access
to our mind. Technological mind-reading can potentially make
the cognitive mechanisms that define privacy itself meaningless.
Thus, by characterizing mental privacy as a psychological (and
fundamental) dimension of privacy we can identify the risks it
involves. However, a critical question is whether these risks affect
some fundamental human dimension that is not threatened by
other kinds of privacy violations.
This kind of cognitive approach to privacy has been developed
in the environmental psychology literature. Interestingly, a
prominent view entails that this capacity is part of what
constitutes our personal identity. One of the most influential
approaches to privacy as a psychological capacity is perhaps Irwin
Altman’s idea that privacy is a boundary regulation process (e.g.,
Altman, 1975). Altman characterizes privacy as the regulation
of social interaction, aimed at achieving an ideal level of
interpersonal contact by avoiding two kinds of imbalances: being
unable to seclude ourselves (e.g., crowding) and overachieving
seclusion (i.e., isolation). Crucially, this equilibrium depends on
control over social inputs (e.g., actively accepting or rejecting
other’s opinions) and social outputs (e.g., avoid or allow someone
listen to one’s opinions) (Altman, 1976; see Margulis, 2003 for a
review of Altman’s approach).
Altman argued that the main function of this process is the
construction of our identity, our understanding of ourselves. It
includes “knowing where one begins and ends vis-a-vis others,
what aspects of the physical and social environment are parts
of the self and which aspects are parts of others” (Altman,
1976, p. 25). The notion of privacy implies a flexible barrier
or boundary between the self and non-self, “such as the cell
membrane becomes more or less permeable, in order to achieve
a viable level of functioning” (Ibid, p. 13). However, it is not
entirely clear whether this notion of privacy can be relevant for
a conception of identity that may be useful in contemporary
neuroethics. I will suggest that a recent and prominent approach
to neurotechnological influences on identity seems to line upwith
key aspects of Altman’s proposal.
DISCUSSION: MENTAL PRIVACY AND
RELATIONAL IDENTITY
There has been a debate in the recent neuroethics literature
regarding how we should conceptualize identity in the situations
in which it seems to be threatened by “mind-writing”
neurotechnologies, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) and
other devices that can potentially modulate neural computation
(e.g., see Klein et al., 2016; Goering et al., 2017; Gilbert et al.,
2018). Mackenzie and Walker (2015) argued that these threats
should be characterized as threats to a narrative and relational
conception of identity. I will claim that such notion is closely
related to mental privacy as a psychological capacity.
Most identity-related concerns of DBS patients are plausibly
not about the modification of our metaphysical essence or
our individuation conditions, which are characterized by
psychological and biological continuity theories of identity. The
main worry seems to be better conceptualized in terms of
practical identity, which articulates one’s self-conception: one’s
defining beliefs and values, motives, emotions, etc. Furthermore,
Mackenzie and Walker’s view is that this self-conception is
not discovered but rather created, there is no pre-existing
real inner self awaiting to be found. We build our personal
identities by developing self-narratives. These are cognitive
structures through which we interpret our personal histories
and psychological traits and shape our intentions and plans.
Finally, Mackenzie and Walker (2015), characterize this self-
creation process in a relational way. Following Baylis, they
affirm that we are “dynamic complex co-creations informed
by the perspectives and creative intentions of others” (Baylis,
2012, p. 118). Constructing a narrative identity is therefore an
ongoing negotiation between our self-ascriptions of identity and
the interpretation (or mis-interpretation) and recognition (or
rejection) of these ascriptions by others. Baylis claims that a
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self-narrative is identity constituting only when it achieves a
temporary stability between our perspective and that of relevant
others, which depends on ongoing interpersonal communication.
If we understand identity as the result of this kind of
interpersonal communicative process, then it is clear how
psychological privacy in Altman’s sense can be considered
a constitutive part of it. The inter-subjective equilibrium
in the construction of an agent’s self-narrative requires her
to regulate a communicative output constituted by her
projected self-narrative and an input constituted by her
perceived narrative (the recognition and/or interpretation
of her self-attributions by others) in a way that reflects
Altman’s boundary regulation. We must first open our inter-
personal “output gate” to make our self-narrative accessible
to others, and also open our inter-personal “input gate,”
being receptive to its interpretation and assessment by others,
thus building a collectively agreed self-narrative. Crucially,
when the self-narrative projected by an agent is disputed
by others, she can achieve equilibrium through a variety
of processes described by Baylis (2012), which also involve
specific forms of inter-personal boundary regulation. She can
seclude herself from dissonant interpretations by changing
her community of belonging in favor of a community likely
to be more accepting of her projected self-narrative, thus
reshaping her inter-personal boundaries. Alternatively, the agent
can change her output, trying to project her self-narrative
more efficiently by sharing more information and being more
open to others. Finally, she could be simply become more
permeable to other’s interpretations, accepting those that are
inconsistent with her perspective and consequently revising her
projected self-narrative.
Thus, the regulation of interpersonal interaction that
is constitutive of an agent’s mental privacy seems to be
part of the communicative process that constitutes her
identity. This means that violations of a person’s mental
privacy, disrupting the cognitive control she has over
what information about herself she shares or receives may
actually affect the very process underlying the formation of
her identity.
CONCLUSION
Mental privacy has emerged in the last years as a critical
concern regarding emerging neurotechnologies. The threat is
perhaps enhanced by the fact that these technologies increasingly
exceed the clinical context. Many novel non-invasive and
potentially ubiquitous consumer neurotechnologies have various
educational, entertainment-related, work-related, and military
applications, which are not fully explored or regulated by either
national laws or international treaties.
Some of the pioneering regulatory frameworks and their
applications by policy-makers support a strong reading of
mental privacy, as a distinctive privacy dimension closely
related to our identity. In this article, I suggested that this
conceptual connectionmay be a key to deepen our understanding
of mental privacy and articulate it with broader discussions
in neuroethics. If we understand mental privacy as the
psychological basis of privacy, we can see how it underlies
the construction of our relational identity. Thus, relational
identity may become a concern which should be addressed not
only in relation to mind-writing neurotechnologies but also to
neurotechnological mind-reading.
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